Unlike international criminal courts, these courts focus exclusively on issues of State responsibility, generally finding that international law has or has not been violated; if a violation is found, matter is usually negotiated to a resolution by the concerned States. Although reparation in the form of restitution, compensation or satisfaction is possible, criminal sanctions are not. Unlike ad hoc arbitral tribunals formed to address matters of investment or commerce, such as under the auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the International Chamber of Commerce, these judicial bodies are permanent institutions; they are designed to operate for decades, with adjudicators who serve for years on a range of cases, not for just a single claim or group of claims. Unlike processes for mediation or conciliation, these courts or tribunals issue decisions that are legally binding on the parties appearing before them.
Such international judicial bodies have a prominent place in the pantheon of international adjudication; indeed, the ICJ is often viewed -symbolically -as at the pinnacle of international adjudication. Yet with the rise of numerous other dispute resolution bodies, including those before which non-State actors may appear and that may hear hundreds of cases per year, questions have arisen as to whether such 'old school' fora still play a dominant or even important role for international law, especially given the relative paucity of their caseloads. applies the rules set forth in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and other rules of international law not incompatible with that Convention. 8 The WTO Appellate Body addresses 'issues of law' and 'legal interpretations' covered in WTO panel reports, 9 which address the interpretation and application of certain WTO agreements 10 against the backdrop of other rules of international law. 11 In the course of such decision-making, it is possible that the court or tribunal will take account of rules expressed in national law if necessary when applying international law.
2) Permanent Institution/Quasi-Permanent (Repeat) Adjudicators
These judicial bodies are permanent institutions, housed in buildings in The Hague (ICJ), Hamburg (ITLOS) or Geneva (WTO Appellate Body), where they are supported by a permanent registry or secretariat. As such, there is a strong sense of institutional continuity, with formal and informal traditions passed along through persons who spend much, if not all, of their careers at the institution.
Each institution establishes its own rules of procedure which, although capable of being modified over time, create a relatively permanent framework of detailed rules for how cases are to be decided, often supplemented by further instruments setting forth practical guidelines. The Rules of the Court of the ICJ, which were drafted by and are periodically revised by the ICJ's judges, were thoroughly revised in 1978, although some further amendments have been made since that time. 12 The ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal were drafted and revised by its judges, with the most recent version adopted in 2009. 13 The WTO Appellate Body's Working Procedures for Appellate
Review have been adopted and revised by the Appellate Body, in consultation with the WTO Director-General and the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, most recently in 2010.
14 While such rules can be modified over time to take account of changed circumstances, they are largely stable, allowing for well-settled practice to develop. Indeed, many of the ICJ's current rules 8 can be traced back to the PCIJ rules first adopted in the 1920's.
The judges or members who sit on these judicial bodies are not permanent, but they are elected or appointed for relatively long-terms, during which they participate in a large number of cases, again reinforcing a culture of continuity as well as reliance on past decision-making. 15 The ICJ consists of 15 respected jurists from across the globe, elected for nine-year terms by the U.N. For all three institutions, the persons are elected or appointed based on their independence, character and expertise. These individuals are paid international civil servants; they receive no pay and take no instructions from governments, and they cannot be recalled or dismissed by the governments of their nationalities. While judges or members are precluded from sitting in a case in which they were previously involved as counsel, they are not prevented from sitting in a case simply because it involves a State of the judge's or member's nationality. Even so, the issue of nationality is not ignored. Two persons of the same nationality would not be elected or appointed 15 See, E Voeten, ' Body's report is placed before the DSB, the report will be adopted and become binding, unless there is a consensus of the DSB not to do so (the process is known as 'reverse consensus').
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Since normally the Party that prevailed before the Appellate Body will block any such consensus, the likelihood of the Appellate Body's decision not being adopted is extremely low and to date has not happened. as important to create an inter-State tribunal -the WTO Appellate Body -charged with promoting unified interpretations of the relevant agreements. As John Jackson has observed, 'the GATT contracting parties resolved at the 1986 launching meeting of the Uruguay Round (at Punta del Este) to deal with some of the defects and problems of existing dispute settlement rules'. 82 The negotiators ultimately concluded that the 'negotiation-oriented' approach to dispute resolution characteristic of the GATT was no longer tenable; less powerful States were unwilling to participate in an ambitious new system of trade rules if dispute resolution could be dominated by the negotiating strength of powerful States. Consequently, the turn was made to a more 'judicialized' and 'rules-oriented' approach to dispute resolution. 83 In setting up that system, arbitration was fine for the initial round of dispute resolution, but only if the arbitral decisions could be appealed to a more permanent, court-like body capable of maintaining uniformity in interpretation and application of the law. In short, establishing a dispute settlement system capped by an inter-State tribunal helped bring to a conclusion the Uruguay Round negotiations. are largely not present. Though habitual resort to these courts or tribunals to vindicate rights under the multilateral agreement is not apparent, the actual use of the forum may be secondary to its availability for use.
2) Promoting Negotiated Resolution of Disputes
The availability of inter-State courts and tribunals, especially for compulsory adjudication, also provides a useful 'shadow' when a dispute arises between States, encouraging them to negotiate an out-of-court resolution. For this reason, a metric by which one assesses the utility of inter-State judicial bodies solely based on the number of cases before those courts misses the effect that their existence has in conditioning State behavior ab initio when the dispute arises. Anytime a State embarks on a major policy initiative, one question for that State will be whether the action violates the State's obligations under international law and, if so, whether other States will react in an adverse manner. If such reactions include the possibility of a highly visible resort to dispute resolution, such as at the ICJ, the ITLOS or the WTO Appellate Body, then it serves as a disincentive for the State to pursue its policy initiative and an incentive to pursue other, legally-available options.
Empirically establishing and measuring this 'deterrence factor is difficult, since it involves proving that a State did not act in a certain way due to the presence of potential litigation at an inter-State court or tribunal. Nevertheless, it appears to be the case that most disputes arising under agreements for which inter-State courts or tribunal are available, such as the law of the sea, are resolved through negotiation 87 and, further, 'it is conceivable that in some cases the parties have settled a dispute consensually because of a desire to avoid compulsory settlement' under the Convention.
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An example of the phenomenon may be seen in the Swordfish Stocks case, which arose after Chile imposed a port ban on Spanish vessels that were fishing swordfish near Chile's EEZ. proceedings at the ITLOS. The dispute was then resolved by negotiation before hearings went forward in either venue. In filing their cases, both sides signaled the seriousness with which they took the dispute and raised the prospect of an inter-State court or tribunal resolving the matter, which entailed uncertainty in the outcome. In light of that, the two sides instead chose to resolve the matter as between themselves, negotiating and compromising in the shadow of potential third-party inter-State court/tribunal dispute resolution.
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3)
Promoting and Protecting a Coherent Legal System
Inter-State judicial bodies provide a unique service by acting as the promoter and guardian of the system of international law in which they operate, capable of providing authoritative action that speaks to the broader functioning and stability of the international legal system than is the case for arbitral or other forums. This role may be seen in three discrete functions.
(a) Promoting Stability and Predictability in Inter-State Relations
A paradox in the operation of inter-State courts and tribunals is that, while it is generally accepted that their decisions only bind the two Parties that appear before them in any given case, it is also generally accepted that the decision reached has ramifications that extend well beyond A broader ramification with respect to the ICJ's decision is that it adds a further building block to the development of a coherent system of law, with its decisions often influencing the development of new treaty regimes and then refining those treaty regimes through subsequent
interpretations. An example of this phenomenon may be seen with respect to the law of the sea. The AB is there not only to solve a particular dispute but also to make the adjudication of similar future transactions (more) predictable. The ICJ has received about 40 requests for interim measures of protection. As a general matter, the Court is willing to issue such measures so long as a prima facie showing of jurisdiction exists, the requested measure is linked to the underlying case before the Court and irreparable harm is likely in the absence of the issuance of the requested measure. 102 In recent cases, the Court also has stated that it 'may exercise this power only if it is satisfied that the rights asserted by a party are at least plausible'. 103 Further, the Court has found that an order on provisional measures is binding upon the States to whom it is directed. 104 The ITLOS may also issue binding provisional measures of protection, if 'appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision'. 105 Moreover, ITLOS may receive applications for the prompt release of a detained vessel or its crew where the authorities of a State have detained a vessel or crew flying the flag of another State and it is alleged that the detaining State did not act in compliance with the LOSC. 106 Such applications may only be made by or on behalf of the vessel's flag State. 107 While the relevant States can choose to take the provisional measures or a prompt release proceeding before some other LOSC dispute resolution forum, ITLOS remains the 'default' tribunal. In other words, it matters not whether the responding State selected the ITLOS for binding dispute resolution when it joined the LOSC; unless the Parties select some other fora for these two types of proceedings, the responding State may be brought before the ITLOS.
The WTO Appellate Body does not have the power to issue interim measures of protection, nor do WTO arbitral panels, largely because of the nature of the violations at issue (denial of trade benefits) and the relatively speedy process at the WTO for resolving the dispute on the merits.
4) Authoritative Resolution of Important Disputes
Sometimes lost in the discussion of inter-State courts and tribunals is that, while their dockets are not extensive, they often include extremely important disputes for those States involved. For example, Nicaragua's case against the United States in the mid-1980's before the ICJ was a critical component of its foreign policy, as was Macedonia's case against Greece in this
century. An inter-State court or tribunal can provide a well-known and respected forum for addressing major grievances; while resort to that forum may be rare, when it occurs the stakes can be high. While the numerous land and boundary delimitation cases before the ICJ do not attract much global notice, they typically concern important bilateral disputes that, left to fester, might well lead to armed conflict.
Likewise, the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body is incrementally solidifying the meaning of key global trade agreements as they apply in bilateral trade relations, which in turn is influencing national decision-making and national laws. 108 Resort to WTO dispute settlement is a highly-public affair, taken by a government for the purpose of protecting key sectors of a State's economy from allegedly unfair and unlawful trade practices, involving goods, services, intellectual property, government procurement and a range of other matters. Even in the early years of the WTO, John Jackson noted that the 'addition of the right to appeal to an Appellate
Body made up of a permanent cadre . . . in conjunction with the automatic approval of panel reports, has already had a very profound impact on the world trading system as embodied in the GATT and WTO'.
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The ITLOS, the youngest of the three inter-State courts discussed here, has attracted the least use, in part because it competes with other dispute settlement fora. Nevertheless, it too has addressed important disputes, most recently the maritime boundary delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar, the first judgment of an international court or tribunal to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the coast.
V) DECLINE AND FALL?
In considering whether inter-State judicial bodies are becoming relics, it is worth considering whether their role has really changed in recent years. Such courts and tribunals were never a dominant feature of international dispute settlement in terms of caseload or exposure of
States to compulsory jurisdiction; there was never a 'golden era' of habitual resort to these courts or tribunals for all disputes arising amongst States. If anything, the number of cases before these courts or tribunals has significantly increased as measured against 50 or even 25 years ago.
Concomitantly, there has been a very significant increase in the establishment and use of other forms of transnational dispute settlement before institutions such as the ICSID, but that burgeoning practice has not collaterally diminished the resort to inter-State courts or tribunals.
Arguably the 'rising tide' of resort to international adjudication is raising all of the dispute settlement 'boats', including those consisting of inter-State courts and tribunals. At the same time, the emergence of 'blended' models when creating new courts and tribunals -in which there exists
